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Abstract. We propose Mixcoin, a protocol to facilitate anonymous pay-
ments in Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies. We build on the emergent
phenomenon of currency mixes, adding an accountability mechanism to
expose theft. We demonstrate that incentives of mixes and clients can
be aligned to ensure that rational mixes will not steal. Our scheme is
ecient and fully compatible with Bitcoin. Against a passive attacker,
our scheme provides an anonymity set of all other users mixing coins
contemporaneously. This is an interesting new property with no clear
analog in better-studied communication mixes. Against active attackers
our scheme oers similar anonymity to traditional communication mixes.
1 Introduction
Protecting the privacy of nancial transactions has long been a goal of the cryp-
tography community, dating at least to Chaum's work on anonymous digital
cash using blind signatures [6]. Despite initial excitement, anonymous digital
payments have not seen mass adoption. One reason is that traditional electronic
cash requires a central, trusted entity, typically called a bank.
By contrast, Bitcoin is a relatively young decentralized currency that has
rocketed to popularity with a monetary base worth over US$6 billion in early
2014. Bitcoin can be thought of as a public, distributed ledger that logs all
transactions in order to prevent double spending [24]. Using a proof-of-work
system, the integrity of the ledger is maintained as long as a majority of the
computing power is contributed by honest participants [18].
Bitcoin does not provide true anonymity: transactions involve pseudonymous
addresses, meaning a user's transactions can often be easily linked together.
Further, if any one of those transactions is linked to the user's identity, all of her
transactions may be exposed. A small but growing body of academic literature
has found that Bitcoin oers only weak anonymity in practice (see Section 2.2).
This has led to the rise of mixing services (or tumblers4) which promise to take
4 Bitcoin tumblers are named after machines used to wash physical coins.2
a user's coins and randomly exchange them for other users' coins to obfuscate
their ownership, though these come with no protection from theft by the service.
The Bitcoin community is well aware of this issue, leading to much interest
in the provision of stronger anonymity. We provide more detail in Section 8, but
existing proposals can be thought of in two main groups. First are proposals
which provide strong anonymity but require advanced cryptography and sub-
stantial modications to Bitcoin, like Zerocoin [22], or even a completely new
currency as with Zerocash [4]. Second, there are proposals such as CoinJoin [19]
or CoinSwap [20] which are backwards-compatible with Bitcoin but have practi-
cal complications and may provide smaller anonymity sets. Our goal is to enable
strong anonymity in a simple scheme that can be deployed immediately. Our
strategy is to build on the existing phenomenon of mixes, but to add an inde-
pendent cryptographic accountability layer. Our main contributions include:
Accountability. Mixcoin mixes issue signed warranties (Section 4) to users which
roughly state: \if Alice sends me v coins by time t1, I will send v coins back to
her by time t2." A user can then condently send funds to the mix, knowing
that if the mix misbehaves she can publish this warranty, damaging the mix's
reputation and (presumably) its business model.
Randomized mixing fees. We show how paying mixes for their services incen-
tivizes honest behavior (Section 6), yet xed fees undermine anonymity when
coins are mixed multiple times. Instead we apply randomized, all-or-nothing fees
in which mixes retain the entire value from a small percentage of transactions.
We show how to generate the requisite randomness in a fair and accountable
manner using the unpredictability of the Bitcoin block chain itself.
Mix indistinguishability. Although users interact with specic mixes, single-use
mix addresses enable a surprising property that passive adversaries can't deter-
mine which mix a user is interacting with. The anonymity set in this case is then
the set of all users interacting with any mix at the same time.
Mix networks for Bitcoin. Against an active attacker who can break mix in-
distinguishability, we draw on the experience from anonymous communication
networks to demonstrate how chaining multiple mixes together can still provide
strong anonymity. There are important dierences from communication mixes,
however, which we discuss in Section 7).
Our core protocol is a very general design, allowing clients and mixes to
specify a variety of free parameters. We expect that, because anonymity loves
company [12], these parameters will converge to global values (Section 7.6). In
particular, we expect mixing to complete in a few hours with mixing fees of less
than 1% (Section 6). Given this modest overhead and the fact that Mixcoin can
be deployed immediately with no changes to Bitcoin itself, it is our hope that
all Bitcoin users will have the opportunity to mix their coins, making strong
nancial privacy practical in a decentralized digital currency.3
2 Background
In this section we provide a basic model of Bitcoin. We focus on the properties
required for Mixcoin, which could be implemented on top of any distributed
currency system similar to Bitcoin in these basic respects. We then model today's
nascent Bitcoin mixes and the attacks they are vulnerable to.
2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin can be thought of as a decentralized system which tracks a mapping
between addresses and monetary value denominated in coins.5 An address, which
we denote , is simply a public key. Addresses are pseudonymous: anybody can
create an arbitrary number of addresses for free with no verication. Control
of an address's private key provides \ownership" of all coins mapped to that
address. The simplest6 Bitcoin transaction is essentially a statement that an
address in would like to transfer some value v to an address out, signed by in.
A distributed consensus protocol maintains a global history of all transactions
to prevent double spending. Transactions are grouped into blocks for eciency,
which are chained in a linear structure called the block chain. The chain rep-
resents (probabilistic) consensus; at present most Bitcoin users will consider a
transaction conrmed if it appears in a block with at least w = 6 blocks following
it. New blocks are generated roughly once every ten minutes.
2.2 Deanonymization in Bitcoin
Creating new addresses is trivial, but this does not make Bitcoin anonymous as
all transfers are globally (and permanently) visible in the block chain. Several
recent papers have studied ways to link a user's addresses to each other and to
an external identity [21,27,29,2].
Four major techniques have been explored. First, in multi-input transactions,
shared spending authority is evidence of joint control. The rationale is that
dierent entities are unlikely to be co-spenders of the same transaction. Second
is the use of taint analysis to track ows. The taint between addresses in and
out is dened as the percentage of the balance of out that came from in. Taint
analysis can overcome simple manual obfuscation techniques. More generally, one
can analyze Bitcoin's overall transaction graph, with each address as a node and
each transaction as a weighted, directed edge between nodes. Various heuristics
can be used for clustering addresses and tracking ows, such as detecting the
\change address" in a multi-output transaction (the rationale being that the
change address is probably controlled by the same entity as the input address).
Third, there are various side channel attacks such as timing, precise values, and
5 This is a simplication for conceptual clarity. On a technical level, monetary value
is assigned to transactions and not to addresses.
6 Bitcoin transactions may feature multiple inputs and outputs. Bitcoin also features
a limited scripting language allowing more complicated transactions.4
network-layer information. Finally, an attacker can use auxiliary information
(e.g., information in forums or gleaned from merchants) to connect pseudonyms
to identities.
The rst three techniques have proved quite powerful. The fourth technique
(use of auxiliary information) is necessary to link a Bitcoin user to a real-world
identity. However, it is more dicult for researchers to carry out using public
information than for a well-funded adversary who may compel disclosures from
various merchants or service providers, so the academic literature has generally
stopped short of this step. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the anonymity
properties of Bitcoin cannot be relied upon in the face of a determined adversary.
2.3 Current Bitcoin mixes
To preserve their privacy, some Bitcoin users exchange their coins using mixes,
directly analogous to the concept in communication networks. In the common
implementation a mixing address receives coins from multiple clients and for-
wards them randomly to a fresh address for each client. Several such services
have arisen, typically charging commissions in the 1{3% range and requiring
manual interaction through a website7 to arrange transactions. A small-scale
study of three mixing services found that in one case, taint analysis was imme-
diately sucient to link the input and output [23]. In the other two cases, taint
analysis did not succeed but the transaction graph showed rich structure, leav-
ing open the question of more sophisticated linking attacks. Anecdotal evidence
from user forums include complaints slow mixing times of up to 48 hours and
low transaction volumes leading to users frequently receiving their own coins in
return.8 Reports of theft by mixes are also a signicant concern, with the popu-
lar Bitcoin Wiki warning: ...if the mixing output fails to be delivered or access
to funds is denied there is no recourse. Use at your own discretion.
In contrast to dedicated mixing services, some services with a high preexisting
trust requirement have deployed implicit mixing successfully. For example, the
Silk Road marketplace mediated and mixed all transactions between buyers and
sellers [7], while some \eWallet" services promise that when users withdraw funds
they will receive random coins from the provider's reserves.
2.4 Mix networks for anonymous communication
Mix networks were introduced by Chaum in 1981 for anonymous communica-
tion [5]. Signicant research has analyzed the relationship between design param-
eters, such as route selection and ushing policies, and the resulting anonymity
(see [26] for a survey), much of which is broadly applicable to nancial mixing.
Veriable mixing, beginning with Sako and Killian [30], aims to provide ac-
countability by mixes issuing a proof that their output is a permutation of their
7 Some mixing services are only accessible as Tor hidden services.
8 Receiving one's own coins back from a mix is not necessarily a vulnerability. This
will happen with probability
1
N in a random permutation of N participant's coins.5
input, particularly important when users cannot trace their own input through
the mix. In reputable mixing, beginning with [15], each mix provides proof that
each output corresponds to some input, as opposed to the mix itself originating
the message. Unfortunately these lines of research are largely orthogonal to the
risk of theft in a nancial mix. In communication mixes, messages can be resent,
which is not possible in Bitcoin as transactions are irreversible.
3 A simple model of mixing
While there are some dierences in how current mixes operate, we describe the
model on which Mixcoin's design rests. We start with a client Alice (A) who
owns some number of Bitcoins at an address in which we assume is linkable
to her real world identity. Alice wishes to transfer some of her funds to a fresh
address out in such a way that it is dicult to link out to in (and hence Alice
herself), in exchange for a mixing fee.
Alice will send some of her coins to a mix M, a for-prot entity which will hold
Alice's funds in escrow for an agreed time period before sending an equal value
to out. We don't require M to have any real-world reputation or assets, only
to maintain the same digital identity long enough to build a virtual reputation.
Alice is exposed to two major threats:
Theft Because mixes routinely send funds to fresh addresses with no transaction
history, it is possible for a malicious mix to send Alice's funds to its own secret
address M instead of out as requested. Though Alice can publicly complain
about the theft and attempt to undermine M's reputation, there is no way for
observers to determine which of A or M owns M and therefore Alice's claim
could be libelous. For-prot mixes may rationally attempt to undermine trust in
their competitors through false accusations of theft. Because allegations of theft
cannot be proven, it is dicult to determine which mixes are honest.
Deanonymization Because the mix learns that the same party owns both ad-
dresses (in;out), Alice's anonymity depends on the mix keeping this pairing
secret forever. A mix which is malicious, compromised, or subpoenaed might
share its records and undermine Alice's anonymity. Alternately, the mix could
send coins in a non-random manner which reveals the connection to observers.
4 The Mixcoin protocol
Our goal with Mixcoin is to provide a protocol for mixing with accountability.
Prior to mixing, the mix gives Alice a signed warranty which will enable her to
unambiguously prove if the mix has misbehaved. Dishonest mixes will quickly
have their reputation destroyed and lose business. Security against theft thus
reduces to properly aligning economic incentives of mixes and clients.
However, there is no way to prove that a mix is not storing records sucient
to deanonymize its clients. Similarly to mix networks for communication, Alice6
can mitigate this risk by relaying coins through a series of mixes which must all
collude in order to deanonymize her nal output address.
4.1 Assumptions
We assume the availability of multiple mixes Mi, each represented by a warranty-
signing key KMi. As for-prot enterprises, mixes are motivated to build and
maintain a reputation in KMi, so it must be used consistently. Unlike mixes, Alice
does not need to maintain any long-term public key nor any public reputation.
Alice must be able to negotiate with the mix over an anonymous and conden-
tial channel. In practice this will likely be realized by mixes running a dedicated
Tor hidden service, but this is out of scope of the Mixcoin protocol itself. Ideally,
this channel will also be deniable for clients, so that the mix cannot prove that
any client contacted it about mixing funds.
4.2 Core protocol
We outline the core Mixcoin protocol in Construction 1 which mixes a single
\chunk" v of Alice's funds. For eective anonymity, chunk sizes should be stan-
dardized, as discussed in Section 7.6. While the core protocol can stand on its
own, typically Alice will need to split her funds into multiple chunks and perform
multiple sequential rounds of mixing for each.
The key accountability mechanism is Alice's receipt of a signed warranty
prior to mixing. In Step 1 Alice contacts the mix over an anonymous channel
and proposes a set of mixing parameters:
v the value (chunk size) to be mixed
t1 the deadline9 by which Alice must send funds to the mix
t2 the deadline by which the mix must return funds to Alice
out the address where Alice wishes to transfer her funds
 the mixing fee rate Alice will pay
n a nonce, used to determine payment of randomized mixing fees
w the number of blocks the mix requires to conrm Alice's payment
If the mix accepts these terms (Step 2a) it generates a fresh escrow address esc
and sends back a warranty containing all of Alice's parameters plus esc, signed
using KM. The mix may also reject Alice's request for any reason (Step 2b),
though in practice we expect that a reputable mix will abide by a published
policy for acceptable terms.10 Alice similarly has no obligation to transfer funds
after receiving a warranty. If Alice declines (or forgets) to do so by the deadline
t1 the mix may delete its records and move on.
If Alice does transfer the agreed value v to esc by the deadline t1 (Step 3),
then the mix is obligated to transfer an equal value to out by time t2 (unless
10 As presented, this is an all-or-nothing negotiation with Alice proposing terms and
the mix either accepting or rejecting. More complicated negotiations are possible
but we expect this to be the simplest.7
The Mixcoin protocol
1) A
anon  ! M:
hv;t1;t2;w;out;;ni
2a) A
anon    M:
fv;t1;t2;w;esc;out;;ngKM
M accepts terms,
species esc
2b) A
anon    M:
?
M rejects terms
A destroys out
3) A (by time t1):
Transfer(v;in;esc)
A pays on time
(from any address)
M aborts protocol
A doesn't pay
X = Beacon(t1;w;n)
X > 
M retains funds
X  
4a) M: (by time t2)
Transfer(v;
0
esc;out)
M acts honestly
4b) No transfer to
out by time t2
M steals funds
A;M destroy records
Protocol successful
5) A publicizes:
fv;t1;t2;w;esc;out;;ngKM
A detects theft (after t2)
Construction 1: A single mixing round between client A and mix M. A owns the
addresses in and out and M owns esc and 0
esc. The random value X
R   (0;1)
is computed using Beacon, a pseudorandom function using the Bitcoin block
t1 + w plus the nonce n, and compared to the fee rate . Times t1 and t2 are
blocks in the block chain. Curly brackets (fgK) indicate a digital signature under
a signing key K.8
the funds are retained as a mixing fee|see Section 4.4). If the mix does so
faithfully (Step 4a), then both parties should destroy their records to ensure
forward anonymity against future data breaches. If the mix fails to transfer the
value v to out by time t2 (Step 4b),11 then Alice publishes her warranty (Step 5).
Because the warranty is signed by the mix's long-term key KM and all Bitcoin
transactions are publicly logged, anybody can verify that the mix cheated.
4.3 Freshness of addresses
Both the mix's escrow address esc and Alice's output address out should be
fresh addresses created specically for this mixing. This is required because war-
ranties include neither in nor 0
esc, so they will appear to be satised as long
as v is transferred on time to esc and then out from any address. Thus both
parties should pick addresses with no other possible source of income so that the
other party must themselves pay to fulll the contract. This has the benet of
minimizing what Alice reveals if she publishes a warranty, as out is useless if
the mixing transaction it was created for ends up failing.
4.4 Mixing fees
A simple approach is to specify a xed mixing fee rate  and have the mix return
(1 )v to out instead of the full v . However, this is problematic for sequential
mixing, as the smaller output value (1 )v cannot be the input to a subsequent
round of mixing with the same v. This could be addressed by using diminishing
transaction sizes vi = (1 )i v for each round i, but this would undermine the
goal (Section 7.6) of indistinguishable transfers and limit the anonymity set in
each round to only other transactions at the same round of mixing.
Our solution is randomized mixing fees, whereby with probability  the mix
retains the entire value v as a fee, and with probability (1   ) takes no fee at
all. This produces an expected mixing fee rate of  and leaves out with either
nothing or a full v which can be directly re-mixed. This solution is related to
the idea of electronic lottery tickets [28] used in some micropayment systems.12
The mix must use a publicly veriable mechanism to randomly choose which
chunks to retain as mixing fees. Specically, the mix must generate a (;1  )-
random bit which neither party can predict but can be audited afterwards for
fairness. This can be done with a public source of randomness called a beacon.
There are other options, such as a coin-tossing protocol [25] between Alice and
the mix, but these would introduce an extra round of communication.
If the beacon is external to Bitcoin (e.g., NIST's beacon [1] or nancial
data [8]), warranties would need to be synchronized to real-world time to enable
11 There is no way in Bitcoin to guarantee a transaction will be included in any specic
block. Therefore in practice mixes will likely require a safety margin of several blocks
to t2 to ensure they can include the transaction before that time.
12 Our motivation to use randomized fees is dierent from the case of micropayment
systems, which do so to avoid transaction costs from many low-valued payments.9
auditing. Alternatively, randomness can be extracted from future Bitcoin blocks,
assuming the exact set of future transactions included in each block (as well as
the random nonce used to solve the proof-of-work puzzle) is unknown.13 Because
each block includes the value of the previous block, every transaction during a
conrmation period of w blocks adds randomness.14 The warranty also includes
a nonce n specied by Alice to ensure that the mix will compute an independent
value for all transactions it is managing. Specically, the mix computes X =
Beacon(t1;w;n) = PRNG(njjBt1+w), where Bi is the Merkle root of block i in
the block chain and PRNG is a cryptographic pseudorandom number generator
which outputs a value uniformly drawn from the range (0;1).
The mix retains Alice's funds only if X  . Because this computation can
be performed by anybody if Alice's warranty is published, cheating by the mix is
detectable. Furthermore, in normal operation Alice's warranty (containing n) is
kept secret so observers can't tell which transactions were retained by the mix.
A drawback of randomized fees is increased variance in the eective mixing
fee rate for users mixing a small number of chunks. To address this, v should be
kept as low as possible so that most users can mix at least v
 coins.
4.5 Transaction fees
In addition to mixing fees, Alice may have to pay transaction fees to Bitcoin
miners to ensure her transactions are included in the block chain.15 Fixed trans-
action fees pose the same problem for anonymity that xed mixing fees would,
but paying miners randomly would require changes to Bitcoin itself.
Given a source of anonymous coins, Alice could address the problem of de-
creasing chunk sizes by \topping up" each chunk after it is mixed using her
pool of anonynmized coins. However, it doesn't work for Alice to simply mix
one chunk perfectly and then use it top up many other chunks, as this would
publicly link each of those topped up chunks as belonging to the same party.
Thus Alice would need a large number of mutually unlinkable addresses holding
transaction-fee sized values useful for topping up. Acquiring these through mix-
ing becomes a recursive problem though, as they themselves would require an
even greater number of unlinkable addresses for their mixing!
Instead, mixes can eectively pay transaction fees both16 for the transfer
from in to esc and from 0
esc to out. Assuming miners require a minimum
transaction fee  (with   v), Alice can transfer v from in of which the mix
will receive v   at address esc. The mix can then form an output transaction
13 A mix might also be a miner, in which case it may attempt to inuence the block.
However, such an attack is highly uneconomical given the high reward for mining a
block compared to mixing fees. We address the infeasiblity this attack in Appendix C.
14 Though in practice w = 6 is a common standard, we include w as a negotiable
parameter in the warranty to enable exibility.
15 Some transactions are accepted today without fees, though miners may change this
at any time, which may occur as the minting rate decreases.
16 In pipelined sequential mixing, which we will discuss in Section 5, most mixes will
need only pay one transaction fee.10
with v    from some 0
esc and 2 from a third address 
esc which the mix
previously retained as a mixing fee, ensuring that out receives a full v while the
miners still collect a fee of  for each transaction. Of course, the mixing fee rate
 must be increased to cover the mix's expected outlays on transaction fees.
This poses a problem for mix indistinguishability, which we'll discuss further
in Section 7.2, as at the mix must use the same 
esc to cover transaction fees for
multiple chunks which will then all clearly come from the same mix. It is also
possible for mixes to collaborate and mix their reserves available for transaction
fees using another mixing technique such as CoinJoin [19], which may be more
suited for mixes to execute than individual users.
5 Sequential mixing
Given the above Mixcoin protocol for interacting with a single mix, Alice will
most likely want to send her funds through N independent mixes to protect
her anonymity against the compromise of an individual mix. To do so, Alice can
choose a sequence of N mixes M1, ...MN and execute the Mixcoin protocol with
each of them in reverse order, instructing each mix Mi to forward her funds to
the escrow address esci+1 which she previously received from mix Mi+1. After
obtaining N signed warranties,17 Alice then transfers her chunk to esc1 and if
any mix in the sequence fails to transfer it she can prove it with the appropriate
warranty. One subtlety is that each mix can likely determine which number it is
in the sequence based on timing information, as the later mixes will be contacted
further in advance from when mixing will actually take place.
In practice, Alice most likely wants to transfer some value kv by splitting
into k separate chunks. This means she will need to negotiate a total of kN
warranties with mixes. An important consideration is that each chunk should
travel through an independently-chosen random sequence of mixes. Otherwise,
Alice's chunks would be exchanged for each other more frequently than would
happen via chance, which would leak information to a potential attacker.
5.1 Dynamic selection of mixing paths
Unlike traditional mix networks, an alternate approach is possible in which Alice
doesn't negotiate an end-to-end path up front but receives her chunks back after
each mix round at fresh intermediate addresses. This approach enables Alice to
dynamically determine which mixes to use and how many, and would hide from
each mix which order it is in the mixing sequence. The downside of this approach
is added latency, as well as paying double the number of transaction fees.18 Given
these drawbacks, we anticipate that dynamic mixing is a less attractive option,
though it could be used in hybrid form with Alice performing multiple sequential
mixes to avoid negotiating a very long path up front.
17 Unlike in traditional communication networks, an onion routing approach doesn't
seem possible due to the interactivity required in Mixcoin.
18 Transaction fees can still be paid by mixes to avoid the chunk size value declining,
but this will require an increase in  which Alice will have to pay.11
6 Mix incentives and mixing fees
Establishing the mixing fee rate  requires considering the dual roles of mixing
fees. First, they can cover direct expenses for mixes such as Bitcoin transaction
fees and electricity bills. Second and most importantly, they provide a mechanism
for mixes to prot from honest behavior and disincentivize mixes from ceasing
operations and absconding with users' funds. Because higher fees more strongly
incentivize honesty, an interesting property arises that users should avoid mixes
charging less than some minimum acceptable value of .
In a steady-state model, the mix has two choices for any given block in time:
continue to operate honestly until the next block, or abscond and retain all user
funds it holds in escrow. The expected value of either choice scales linearly with
Q, the average amount of money owing into (and out of) the mix during any one
block. If  t is the average time period (in blocks) that the mix holds funds during
a mixing round, then the expected payo of absconding is E[abscond] = Q t.
The expected payo from choosing to continue would properly be dened
recursively, since the mix is able to play the same game again. However, under
steady state conditions the optimal decision will be the same in every round, so
if the mix initially chooses to continue it will do so indenitely. Assuming the
mix is exponentially discounting future earnings19 at a rate r (per block), the
net present value of indenite honest behavior with a fee rate  is:
E[continue] = Q + (1   r)E[continue]
= Q + (1   r)Q + (1   r)2Q + :::
=

r
Q
Incentivizing honest behavior therefore requires that

r >  t. With the inter-
pretation that r for a rational mix is equivalent to the highest available risk-free
rate of return available, this condition is simply that the expected value of fees
collected by a mix during the time it holds funds is greater than the amount
those funds would yield during the same time period if invested.20 This can be
explained by considering that we want an honest mix to continually decided to
\invest" its potential earnings Q t from absconding into continuing to serve as a
mix, earning a return of Q during every block.
We can estimate that relatively low mixing fees should suce to incentivize
honest behavior. Assuming a very attractive rate of return of r  20% annually is
available to the mix, a mix time of  t  1 hour gives a lower bound of min  2 15.
Even considering a chunk taking a path through 10 consecutive mixes, this still
leaves only an eective fee rate of  2 12 necessary to discourage absconding.
This suggests that very low mixing fees may be sucient to cover the risk of theft.
19 The exchange rate of bitcoins may of course be drastically dierent in the future.
We assume mixes have no private information about the future value of bitcoins and
therefore use its current market price in calculating the net present value.
20 This equivalence ignores the eects of compounding interest, though r and  t are
both low enough that (1 + r)
 t  1 + r t.12
Absconding might be slightly more favorable in practice due to several factors
missing from a simple analysis, such as super-exponential time discounting by
the mix, the risk that business may decline, or the fact that the mix can choose
to abscond during a period of unusually high transaction ow.
Still, actual mixing fees will be dominated by operating costs, suggesting that
any mix which has been operating for a non-trivial period of time is turning a
prot and is unlikely to abscond. Unfortunately, Alice can't know what mixes'
operating costs are, and therefore cannot verify that a rational mix will choose to
stay in business at a given instant. Nevertheless, since absconding is a one-time
action, she can gain some assurance from the longevity of the mix.
7 Anonymity properties
Given the large number of negotiable parameters in Mixcoin, our anonymity
analysis is theoretical. The actual anonymity guarantees will depend on how
the mixing ecosystem evolves. However, we can describe a threat model, quan-
tify anonymity under a simplied model, discuss optimal strategies for mixes and
clients, enumerate some attacks and how to avoid them. We can draw many con-
nections to the extensive literature on mix networks for communication, dating
to the initial proposal of communication mixes [5]. That said, nancial mixing
also diers from communication networks in important ways.
7.1 Threat model
Mixing literature typically analyzes the anonymity set of possible partners in a
communications network. For unidirectional or message-based systems (as op-
posed to streams), the anonymity set may be considered separately for senders
and receivers though the two often have symmetric properties. With Mixcoin
the common case is a single linkable input address sending multiple chunks to
distinct output addresses which never receive any other input. We focus on an
attacker who wants to gain as much information as possible about the anonymity
set of possible pre-mixing input addresses which may have been the source of
the funds held by a nal output address out.
Because the Bitcoin block chain is a permanent, public record of all trans-
actions, every attacker is trivially a global passive adversary, a common attack
model studied for communication mixes.21 Mixing literature also considers ex-
tended attacker capabilities, such as compromising mixes, delaying or blocking
messages, replaying old messages, or ooding the network with dummy mes-
sages [32]. Replay should be impossible in Mixcoin due to the double spending
prevention in Bitcoin. Flooding is possible and we should assume attackers have
this capability. Delaying Bitcoin transactions is possible, but not trivial. Any
miner can refuse to include transactions in blocks they mine, but this scales
21 Tor is notably not designed to withstand attack by a global passive adversary, as
Tor relays provide no mixing of trac [13].13
with the proportion of mining power the attacker controls, making an eective
attack practically expensive. An attacker might also try to ood miners with
larger value transactions, but there is no way to do so selectively and this would
thus amount to a denial of service attack on all of Bitcoin. Assuming an attacker
doesn't control a substantial portion of the mining pool, blocking transactions
indenitely should be eectively impossible.
7.2 The passive adversary's view with mix indistinguishability
The best-case scenario for Mixcoin is a passive adversary. We assume this adver-
sary can reliably determine with high probability which Bitcoin transactions are
mix trac, given their size v and their use of one-time escrow addresses. How-
ever, due to their one-time nature, this simple adversary may be unable to link
escrow addresses to specic mixes, a novel property with no apparent precedent
in communication mixes which we call mix indistinguishability.
If this is the case, the adversary is left to observe a sea of apparently iden-
tical escrow addresses and the system appears to function as one universal mix
consisting of all participants using the chunk size v. There are several scenarios
in which mix indistinguishability may fail (which we will discuss in Section 7.3)
but the anonymity oered is quite strong in this case.
Phantom mixing Mix indistinguishability brings about an interesting possi-
bility, also with no precedent in communication mixes. Users may apparently
gain some anonymity by \phantom mixing": sending their funds through escrow
addresses they control themselves. To a passive observer this is indistinguishable
from a user sending funds through a genuine third-party mix. Of course, if a sig-
nicant proportion of users do this, these users will lose anonymity as attackers
will be able to infer that the owner of a chunk's nal output address is the same
as the owner of the chunk's input address with elevated probability. Therefore
we don't consider this to be a likely phenomenon.
7.3 Active adversaries and distinguishable mixes
There are several ways that an active attacker might be able to distinguish which
escrow addresses correspond to which mix and hence which mixes are involved in
a chunk's mixing path. Observe that when Alice sends a chunk from in to M via
esc, the client who ultimately receives this chunk will learn that in interacted
with M. Similarly, the client who sends the chunk to 0
esc which is eventually
sent to out will also learn that Alice interacted with M. An active adversary can
exploit this in a ooding attack, learning up to two other addresses interacting
with the same mix for each chunk sent through that mix.
A second attack vector, if mixes are forced pay transaction fees, is that when
a user's chunk is retained as a mixing fee by mix M it may might be used by
M to pay transaction fees on many other transactions, all of which can then be
linked to M. The eectiveness of this attack depends on the ratio of transaction14
fees per chunk  to average mixing fees per chunk v. Mixes will have to spend a
proportion 
v of their mixing fee revenue on transaction fees, so if mixes allocate
a constant proportion of each retained chunk to transaction fees each retained
chunk will pay fees on 1
  
v other transactions. Since each chunk is retained
with probability , the expected number of transactions identiable by a given
input transaction is just 
v, which is maximized at 1 if mixing fees are only high
enough to cover transaction fees. Thus for each mixing transaction an active
attacker performs with M, she can link up to (1  )2+ 
v other transactions
to M. Observing the majority of links therefore appears to require an attacker
generate a large portion of the mix's trac.
Finally, the attacker may be the mix themselves, or be able compromise
the mix or subpoena its records, which would reveal all input/output pairs. We
could attempt to supplement Mixcoin by issuing users blinded tokens to redeem
with the mix in exchange for coins in the style of Chaum's original digital cash
scheme [6]. However, this would greatly complicate dispute resolution as the user
must prove that they attempted to redeem their token to the mix and the mix
refused. This would require publishing redemption orders to a public ledger, such
as Bitcoin itself. We leave the details of such a scheme for future work.
Against such a strong active attacker who can link every escrow address to its
originating mix, the system appears similar to be a traditional communication
mix network with mixes behaving as stop-and-go mixes [17] with limited pooling
due to the block size. Stop-and-go mixes suer from low guarantees of anonymity
in periods of low trac, but implementing other strategies such as threshold
mixes appears very dicult to achieve with our warranty systems as signicantly
more information (including the entire set of transactions sent to a mix) would
need to be available to enforce warranties. Assuming a reasonably steady ow
of trac, the anonymity set still snowballs quickly. We demonstrate this via
simulation in Appendix D.
7.4 Anonymity sets and mix delay
Regardless of mix distinguishability, there is a trade-o between mixing chunks
with many mixes for a short escrow period each or few mixes with a longer escrow
period. The escrow period is limited by t2 and t1 as specied in the warranty,
with a maximum delay of max = t2 t1. Mixes will also require a minimum delay
of min = w (typically 6 blocks) to protect against double spending. Picking the
smallest possible t2 = t1 + w allows Alice to aord more rounds of mixing in a
given time period. But this also means that Alice's anonymity set for the round
consists only of other chunks that were mixed at time exactly t1.
We assume that individual mixes will only issue warranties with a specic
max as a matter of policy,22 and will then uniformly at random choose a de-
lay  2R [w;max] before forwarding Alice's chunk.23 Thus each mixing step
22 Allowing dierent delays per client would open the possibility of free-riding and
make anonymity analysis much more complex [14].
23 Non-uniform distributions such as an exponential distribution are possible, but they
make it dicult to provide a rm bound on the delay as required by the warranty.15
adds lg(Q(max   w + 1)) bits of entropy to Alice's anonymity set, at a delay
of max blocks.24 In other words, the entropy of her anonymity set grows by
lg(Q(max w+1))
max per block. It turns out that for w = 6 this expression is maxi-
mized for max = 6 for Q  128 (and max = 7 for 13  Q < 128) so it appears
minimal delays and longer mixing chains are preferable.
Whatever the mix's published policy is, Alice can easily verify that the ran-
dom distribution of  matches the mix's policy since we expect that over time
she will send a large number of chunks to the mix. If the mix cheats and picks de-
lays that don't match the distribution specied in its policy, it is not a violation
of the warranty (as long as the mix adheres to its maximum delay). However,
individual clients can detect this cheating and take their business elsewhere.
Latency/anonymity trade-o If we are willing to sacrice mix indistin-
guishability, mixes can signicantly decrease latency by skipping the normal
conrmation delay of w = 6 blocks, batching all of their Q permuted chunks in
a given block into one atomic transaction with Q inputs and Q outputs. In the
event of a fork, if any input transaction to the mix is removed from the block
chain the entire transaction will be invalid and can't be replayed, protecting the
mix. Thus there is a trade-o between anonymity and latency, and much lower
latency can be achieved at the cost of mix indistinguishability.
7.5 Mixing multiple chunks
So far we have considered each chunk individually. However, if Alice combines
many mixed chunks to make a payment, her anonymity set will be reduced
to the intersection of the anonymity sets of all chunks. As long as she mixed
those chunks suciently at the same time, then those chunks will have the same
anonymity sets, and her payment is still unlinkable.
However, if even one of the chunks travels through a path consisting entirely
of compromised mixes, Alice's entire payment completely loses anonymity. If
each chunk is routed independently, then with say 25% of mixes compromised,
there is a 2 20 chance of routing a chunk through a chain of 10 compromised
mixes, which may be acceptably low. However this probability increases rapidly
if a greater fraction of mixes are compromised. One way to avoid this would be
to randomly pick a set of mixes for each batch of funds to mix, and to use a
random permutation of that set for each chunks in the batch. In Tor, there is
a similar argument for why building circuits improves anonymity as opposed to
routing each packet independently.
The selection of mixes for each chunk's path poses an interesting challenge.
For anonymity, each chunk's path should be chosen independently at random
from the same distribution. We envision mix reputation lists (MRLs) published
by neutral evaluators which estimate legitimate mix transaction volume via the
24 Because Alice must have already negotiated her mixing warranty for the next round,
each warranty must be delayed by the maximum max blocks.16
methods outlined in Appendix B. Such lists would include a suggested proba-
bility distribution over mixes based on reputation scores, limiting exposure to
unreputable mixes without weighing too heavily towards a small set of the most
reputable mixes which could collude to break anonymity. Users will want to share
a random path selection algorithm to avoid leaking information, and therefore
we expect a few dominant MRL services to arise.
It seems tempting to simply use the N most popular mixes permanently, since
using more popular mixes improves the anonymity set. However, using popular
mixes improves anonymity only against an very powerful active adversary, and
popular mixes may be more attractive targets for the adversary to compromise
leading to a greater probability of picking a completely compromised path. This
question also impacts how many mixes we expect to see. If there is a strong
preference for popular mixes, then the barrier to entry will be high and the rst
entrants will corner the market. If not, there will be a diversity of mixes. It is
impossible to denitively answer this question, but our best guess is that there
will be perhaps a dozen popular mixes followed by a long tail, and clients will
use a combination of the two types in the paths they choose.
7.6 Convergence of free parameters
Our design intentionally leaves many parameters free, such as the chunk size v,
the time delay t2   t1 and the number of rounds N. Our philosophy is to avoid
embedding these into the protocol as the optimal choices may drift over time as
the mixing ecosystem evolves and the underlying parameters of Bitcoin change.
Yet it is critical for anonymity that a large number of users choose the same
values25 to avoid splitting their anonymity sets based on parameter choices.
As a case study, consider the eect of two dierent common values of v.
Each will be clearly identiable in the block chain and hence the anonymity set
for each chunk is limited in the best case to those users who mixed a chunk
of identical size in the same time period. We could attempt to ameliorate this
slightly by hoping that all users mix chunks of both sizes regularly, but this
is quite fragile.26 The best-case scenario for anonymity is if all users choose the
same chunk size. Yet there is an inherent trade-o: setting v too high will exclude
users owning less than v coins,27 while decreasing v will require proportionately
more runs of the protocol and more transactions in the block chain.28
Still, we expect v and other parameters to converge in practice to a common
value (or a small set) for two reasons. First, like with Bitcoin itself most clients
25 Note that the mixing fee rate  is unobservable and hence should have no impact on
anonymity and can be chosen independently by dierent mixes.
26 For example, if chunk sizes  and  are common, a user mixing x = k1 + k2 will
have her anonymity set limited to other users mixing at least k1 chunks of size 
and at least k2 of size , instead of all users mixing at least x.
27 Additionally, with randomized mixing fees (see Section 4.4) users owning only a
small multiple of v may face unacceptably high variance in their fee rate.
28 The Bitcoin community frowns on creating large numbers of low-value transactions
(referred to as dust) because it places a higher verication burden on miners.17
will likely use one of a small number of software implementations which include
reasonable parameters and a popular mix reputation list, as discussed in Section
7.5
Second and more importantly, all clients have an incentive to choose the
most popular parameters in an application of the \anonymity loves company"
principle [12]. Unilateral variation in a user's transaction sizes, for example,
could leak information which would help Eve deanonymize Alice's coins. Thus we
expect Mixcoin users to relatively quickly converge on a global set of parameters,
or possibly a small number of \avors" of Mixcoin, to maximize anonymity.
It is an open question how these parameters might change over time. For
example, as Bitcoin experiences ination or deation the optimal chunk size will
change. We expect that the ecosystem would react by introducing a new chunk
size, with a transitional period where some mixes and clients use the old size
and others use the new one, with the new chunk size gradually winning over.
7.7 Side channels
Financial mixing introduces several subtle side channels.29 The most obvious is
payment sizes: If Alice receives a very specic amount of Bitcoins at her long-
term address, is observed mixing them, and a day later an equal quantity of
mixed chunks are combined to make a payment, the adversary might plausibly
infer that Alice made the payment.30 This can be addressed if Alice mixes her
incoming funds as soon as she receives them and not immediately prior to making
a payment. Of course, this requires Alice to always carry a balance of mixed funds
and never pay them all out at once.
More subtle issues arise because mixed chunks carry an implicit timestamp
of when they were last mixed. Suppose Alice immediately mixes three large,
equal-sized quantities of income on three specic dates and then later combines
a random subset of her mixed chunks to make a payment. Eve can trace the
outgoing payment to Alice if it contains a mix of chunks from these times and
Alice was the only person mixing at each of them.31 The attack might work even
if Alice wasn't the only person mixing: if Alice picks a random set of her mixed
chunks, then the proportion of chunks from each time period in the outgoing
payment will correspond to the amount Alice mixed in each time period.
Thus, even perfect mixing can leave Alice's transactions linkable without
further obfuscation. One defense is for Alice to only make payments using chunks
that were mixed contemporaneously. This works if payments are small enough.
Second, Alice could re-mix all of her chunks every time she receives income. This
destroys the timing information, but is expensive. Third, if Alice has advance
notice before needing to make a payment, she can employ input/output mixing.
Alice mixes her funds as soon as she receives income. When she needs to make a
29 Network-level side channels are out of scope. As noted earlier, we assume that Mix-
coin clients always communicate using a secure anonymity network such as Tor.
30 This is analogous to a packet counting attack in communication mixes.
31 This is analogous to an intersection attack in the mixing literature.18
payment, she mixes a set of (already mixed) chunks totaling the amount she owes.
It introduces a delay in payment equivalent to mixing time, which is why Alice
must have advance notice. Finally, in Appendix A we introduce continual mixing,
a more complex approach which can provide stronger guarantees of anonymity.
8 Related Bitcoin anonymity technologies
Several academic proposals have aimed to provide strong anonymity crypto-
graphically. Most prominent is Zerocoin [22], which uses a cryptographic accu-
mulator with zero-knowledge proofs of inclusion to implement a global currency
pool from which users can deposit coins and withdraw random coins without
any trusted parties. Unfortunately Zerocoin and related proposalssuch as Pinoc-
chio coin [10] require modications to Bitcoin which appear unlikely due to the
computational overhead. Mixcoin, by contrast, can be deployed immediately.
Zerocash [4] provides even stronger anonymity, revealing no information pub-
licly which links the source and destination of transactions. Zerocoin fundamen-
tally requires starting a new currency and hence is not backwards-compatible
with Bitcoin or related currencies. Zerocash also requires a trusted setup phase,
and knowledge of the randomness used can be used to forge coins.32
An alternate line of research, mostly arising from the Bitcoin developer com-
munity, is to remove the trust requirement from mixing using more complicated
(but already supported) Bitcoin transaction scripts. For example, Barber et al.'s
\fair exchange" protocol [3] or Maxwell's CoinSwap [20] allow two parties to
anonymously swap coins with no risk of theft using a multi-step protocol and at
least 4 transactions (compared to 2 in Mixcoin). Both of these protocols could
be used as an alternative to Mixcoin to facilitate mixing with no risk of theft and
mix indistinguishability against a passive attacker and our anonymity analysis
would still apply, including the loss of mix indistinguishability against a ooding
attack. Incorporating transaction fees is another open problem in these protocols
and there doesn't appear to be a simple way to apply our randomized approach.
Finally, CoinJoin [19] enables k users to atomically transfer funds from their
k input addresses to their k output addresses in a random permutation. Since
the transaction is atomic and requires every participant to sign, there is no risk
of theft. The transaction functions as an implicit mix between the participants.
However arranging the output addresses randomly without users learning the
correspondence for other users' coins introduces complexity. This can be solved
cryptographically [9], but this likely limits k to tens of users or less. Alternately,
a trusted facilitator can be used, in which case k is limited to perhaps hundreds
of users due to the cost of increasingly large transactions. In either case, a sin-
gle attacker can easily block the transaction by participating initially to form
the transaction, but failing to sign the nalized transaction. Overall we expect
CoinJoin might be useful for small-scale mixing but the anonymity oered may
be lower due to the lack of mix indistinguishability.
32 The trusted setup may be obviated using techniques like RSA-UFOs [31].19
9 Conclusion
Despite signicant interest in providing strong anonymity for Bitcoin, the design
of a robust protocol with that can be deployed without modications to Bitcoin
has remained an open question. In this paper we proposed Mixcoin, which we
believe meets these goals. Our key innovations are cryptographic accountability,
randomized mixing fees, and an adaptation of mix networks to Bitcoin. We look
forward to engaging with the academic community and the Bitcoin community to
further rene the design and to progress toward implementation and deployment.
We also provide an initial treatment of mixing for nancial privacy, a research
area which we expect will be as deep and challenging as mixing for communica-
tion privacy. Many basic properties of communication mixes, such as the ability
to pad or replay messages, don't exist in a nancial setting. Yet interesting new
properties, such as the possibility of indistinguishable mixes, arise. We expect
that ensuring nancial privacy, regardless of the underlying mixing protocol, will
require careful consideration of some of the higher-level side channels we have
only briey explored here.
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A Continual mixing
A more in-depth defense against some of the side-channel attacks introduced
in Section 7.7 is continual mixing, which does not require advance notice of
payments. In addition to avoiding the timing side channel, it actually increases
Alice's anonymity set. The core idea is that Alice continues mixing her coins until
she is ready to spend them, but at a greatly reduced rate (e.g., one round per
month). Let A be a time period such that Alice is prepared to keep her coins
for time A between receiving them and spending them. Then the continual
mixing algorithm for a chunk c for which initial mixing completes at time t0 is
as follows:
 generate A;c = U[0;A]
 mix c at time A;c and thereafter at A intervals
 mark c as spendable after the rst continual mix round
It is easy to verify that regardless of the timings of the payments received
by Alice, the distribution last mixing times for each of her spendable chunks
is always U[0;A]. This nullies the timing channel, except for the matter of
picking A. If Alice makes a payment with a random subset of her spendable
chunks, Eve can infer A with high accuracy.
Picking  involves a trade-o. From the point of view of a business, if  is
too high, it adds latency to the operating cycle and decreases cash ow. If 
is too low, it leads to a higher depreciation rate of long-term assets due to the
mixing fees incurred by continual mixing. Further, clients must consider each
others' choices in picking , since anonymity loves company and highly unusual
values of  will help Eve.
Given these constraints, we propose several globally xed values of : for
instance, a day, a week, a month, and a quarter; each client is free to pick
the value that best suits their operating patterns. Alice can now expect her
anonymity set to be the set of all Mixcoin clients who have the same value of .22
Some inference attacks are hard to prevent with any mixing system. For
example, if Alice owes Bob a highly unique amount of money, and neither Alice
nor Bob transacts with any other users, this information is sucient to link
Alice's outow with Bob's inow. Unlikely as such situations are for most users
in the real world, they pose a problem for analysis of anonymity of our system.
B Improving mix trustworthiness
If a mix cheats, the cheated client can ensure that the mix gets a poor reputation.
But how can a mix build a reputation for trustworthiness? Even if there are no
theft reports against it, it might simply be because the mix doesn't have much
volume yet. Further, to the extent that more popular mixes may oer better
anonymity (Section 7.3), clients would like to estimate mix transaction volumes.
In this section we discuss ways to better measure, as well as prove, mix trust-
worthiness, and even a mechanism for recourse against cheating mixes. These
are all \out-of-band" and do not require modications to the Mixcoin protocol.
B.1 External reputation
While some mix operators may choose to be anonymous, others may be comfort-
able revealing their real-world identity. A bank or trusted community member
could leverage their external reputation to increase trust in their mix service.
B.2 Throttling
Throttling, or rate limiting by the client, lets Alice limit her exposure to a given
mix at any given time. If Alice wants her maximum exposure to M to be E,
she transacts with M at the average rate of E
max per block, where max is the
maximum mix delay that she picks for M. If she stops transacting with M as
soon as she detects misbehavior, then M can steal at most E of her coins.
B.3 Aggregating theft reports
Essential to the success of Mixcoin is an external mechanism for client software
to report theft by mixes. These reports will be aggregated and re-distributed to
clients. Since it is impossible to falsely allege theft, this mechanism need not be
trusted. Further, this aggregator could combine theft report data with estimates
of mix volumes to publish mix reputation lists.
B.4 User reports
To estimate volume, client users could publish through out-of-band channels,
such as forums, logs containing aggregate statistics about their usage of various
mixes (e.g., \Alice mixed 10,000 chunks through mix M1 in August"). If these
are reputable members of the community (for example, with longstanding active
accounts), observers can be reasonably condent that they are not sybils. Such
reports provide lower bounds on mix volume.23
B.5 Mark and recapture
The mark-and-recapture method for estimating wildlife populations (e.g., [16])
could be used to estimate a mix's escrow reserves and hence its volume. The
method involves engaging the mix in n transactions over a short period, and
observing what fraction of these get forwarded among the set of corresponding
return transactions. If the transaction volume of the mix is Q, then at any time
the escrow pool contains Q transactions, and the expected number of correspond-
ing returns is approximately n=Q when n is much smaller than Q. The mix may
attempt to inate this measurement by simulating transactions of sybil clients
and contributing its own funds to the escrow pool. To defeat sybil detection by
transacting with other mixes would incur fees proportional to the inated vol-
ume. Thus, to inate the apparent volume to twice the actual amount, the mix
would have to forego its entire prots.
A more rigorous version of this is for a reputable entity, such as Consumer
Reports, to perform a survey of publicly known mixes by periodically carry-
ing out small transactions and report the results. The success of this approach
depends on the (network-level) anonymity of the surveyor's actions.33
B.6 Fidelity bonds
As we discussed in Section 6, once a mix steady state, it is rational to stay in
business. Bootstrapping trust is a challenge for new, unknown mix service with
many parallels in business and in life. In fact, the earliest modern banks faced
the issue of getting clients to entrust their money. How could clients be sure the
bank wouldn't disappear overnight? The banks solved this problem by signaling
with huge, expensive buildings with gleaming facades that they were in it for
the long haul.34
Eort and money expended by the operator of a new mix in advertising the
service could serve as such a costly signal. But Bitcoin also has a mechanism
for explicit signaling: delity bonds.Somewhat dierent from real-world delity
bonds, Bitcoin delity bonds are a protocol for the owner of a Bitcoin address
to sacrice coins, i.e., make them provably unspendable. We envision that mixes
might optionally put up a delity bond to gain trust initially.
One possible game-theoretic explanation for why signaling by banks worked,
and why delity bonds by mixes might work, involves asymmetric information.
Let's say a business (a bank or mix) has done the research and concluded that
the market is ripe for a new entrant. It therefore sets up shop with honest
intentions. But consider clients who typically do not have access to this market
research or other reasons for the business's belief in its long-term viability. To
33 As an aside, anonymity is an issue for survey organizations in physical-world trans-
actions as well. Consumer reports had a policy of purchasing vehicles with cash to
protect their identity, but had to abandon the practice when car dealers realized
that they were the only entity to pay with cash.
34 Other examples of costly actions undertaken for the purpose of signaling commitment
are gang initiations and engagement rings.24
such a client, the business may very well have the intention of never reaching the
steady state, but instead absconding as soon as a few tentative clients entrust
them with money money. By undertaking a costly action, the business signals its
belief that it can be viable. Since the sunk cost exceeds what the business might
gain by absconding before reaching the steady state, a business that does not
believe in its own viability will not undertake the costly action. Via a Bayesian
argument, the client can infer that the business does not intend to abscond.
C Manipulating the beacon generated by the block chain
In Section 4.4, we assumed that values in the block chain are unpredictable for
both Alice and the mix, and therefore can be safely used to determine which
transactions the mix is able to retain as a fee. In reality, the mix might also
control signicant mining resources and therefore attempt to inuence the value
of blocks in the chain to collect a higher eective mixing fee rate than .
This attack faces two major diculties. First, it is very costly to inuence
blocks. Because the value of block hashes is the output of a proof-of-work scheme,
the only eective means for inuencing their value is to discard some valid blocks
which M nds in hopes of nding an alternate block which increases the num-
ber of mixing fees M collects. Discarding otherwise valid blocks makes the at-
tack very expensive, given the high value of mined blocks (currently around
US$20,000) and expense of computing them.
Second, even given the ability to discard some blocks in the hope of nding a
block which allows M to collect a higher mixing fee than usual, it is dicult to
nd a block which will signicantly increase the number of mixing fees retained.
Assuming the mix is holding Q transactions and is able to choose from a small
number n of potential blocks, each potential block enables the mix to retain
an independently random subset of the Q transactions with probability  each.
The number of transactions retained is therefore a multinomial distribution with
expected value Q and variance Q(1   ). Under reasonable assumptions for
Q and , for example Q = 100 and  = 2%, even generating 1000 valid blocks
(which would be absurdly expensive computationally) produces less than a 40%
chance of nding a block which even doubles the mix's fee rate.
D Growth in anonymity against a strong attacker
As claimed in Section 7.3, even against an attacker able to identify which mixes
correspond to escrow addresses in the block chain the probability distribution
over the anonymity set of a chunk rapidly approaches the uniform distribution
after multiple rounds of mixing. Assume that there are m mixes, and Q chunks
are being mixed in N concurrent, synchronous rounds. In other words, in each
round, each chunk is assigned to a given mix, and its anonymity set for that
round is the set of all other chunks assigned to that mix in that round. We
can quantify this by measuring the statistical distance (L1 distance) from the
uniform distribution. Figure 1 summarizes the results of simulation.25
Fig.1. Simulation. Statistical distance (L1 distance) between PDF of a chunk's
anonymity set and the uniform distribution, as a function of the number of rounds.
Q = 1000 chunks in all experiments.
The rst line shows m = 100 mixes, with each mix being equally popular
(i.e., in each round, each chunk is independently equally likely to be sent to each
mix). We observe that the statistical distance of the PDF from uniform drops
exponentially with the number of rounds. After 7 rounds it is under 0.1, and
after 10 rounds it is about 2:4  10 4.
The other lines show the situation when the mix trac is skewed according
to a power law distribution, i.e., in each round, each chunk is independently sent
to mix i with probability proportional to 1
i. Here the distribution converges to
uniform even faster. Decreasing the number of mixes has a similar eect. These
are both illustrations of the fact that anonymity loves company. The degree of
anonymity [11] converges to 1 similarly. With 100 mixes with power-law trac,
after 4 rounds it exceeds 0.99 and after 10 rounds it is about 1   2  10 9.
While this is a simplied model, we can infer a lot about the anonymity
properties of Mixcoin. Qualitatively, after a few rounds Alice's chunk is uniformly
mixed with all the other chunks that are being mixed contemporaneously. The
chunk's anonymity set does not include chunks that were mixed at a dierent
time, for example a month ago. If the attacker has compromised some of the
mixes, as long as some of the rounds of mixing (say N0) went through honest
mixes, the anonymity properties are identical to using N0 rounds of mixing with
all honest mixes.